Gulf Economies Weather US-Iran Conflict on Deep Reserves
Reserves, pipelines and high crude prices keep GCC balance sheets intact
Gulf economies have absorbed the shock of the US-Iran conflict with more financial strength than most analysts anticipated. The story is fundamentally one of capital: reserves built up over years, pipelines financed to create export options, and oil prices high enough to compensate for lost shipping lanes. For investors and market-watchers, the region’s performance since late February offers a case study in how sovereign balance sheets and infrastructure spending can convert geopolitical risk into a manageable cost of doing business.
The conflict began after U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran triggered hostilities that effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to normal commercial shipping. The strait normally carries about a fifth of global oil consumption, so the disruption threatened a major revenue source for Gulf states and raised immediate concerns about pressure on their foreign exchange reserves. Those fears have so far proven overstated.
The six Gulf Cooperation Council states entered the conflict with substantial foreign exchange reserves, a buffer that cushioned both lost oil revenues and higher costs. “Foreign reserves have been more resilient than initially feared,” said Said Bakr, a research associate in political economy at the Arab Gulf States Institute. Rising crude prices have offset a decline in export volumes, meaning the revenue line held even as physical flows tightened.
That pricing dynamic has been central to sustaining Gulf-state earnings. Oil moved from an average of $66 per barrel in January to over $100 in September, and continued exports, albeit at lower volumes, kept revenue flowing. Meanwhile, earnings from non-oil sectors are booming as the GCC states diversify their economies, adding a second income stream at precisely the moment the first was under threat.
The physical rerouting of crude illustrates how earlier capital commitments are paying off. Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, together with attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, forced Gulf oil exporters to find alternative routes to international markets. Saudi Arabia continues to move crude through its East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu after a temporary shutdown caused by a September drone attack. The UAE has relied on its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which carries oil to the Gulf of Oman and bypasses the Strait of Hormuz entirely. Shipping has also been redirected toward Africa, where ports in countries like South Africa along the coast have benefited greatly.
The reserve numbers confirm the resilience. Saudi Arabia’s reserves rose to 1.82 trillion Saudi riyals ($485.3 billion) in August from 1.78 trillion riyals ($474.6 billion) in January. The UAE’s reserves have remained relatively stable, ending the second quarter at 931.4 billion dirhams ($253.6 billion). Stable reserves have helped these states maintain currency stability, meet trade obligations, and avoid disruptive measures like sharp spending cuts, while large sovereign wealth assets have provided additional buffers.
“The war and the Strait closure will impact the flow and direction of reserves but will not structurally dent the comparative advantage of the Gulf states,” said Bader Al-Saif, assistant professor at Kuwait University and associate fellow at Chatham House. For creditors and counterparties, that assessment underscores the region’s creditworthiness through a period of severe external stress.
The picture is not uniformly strong. Bahrain stands out as the exception, with negative flows eroding its position. Servicing high government debt and a widening budget deficit pushed its reserves down to $3.9 billion in June, from $7.1 billion in February. The divergence highlights how fiscal discipline and reserve accumulation ahead of a crisis determine which sovereigns can self-insure and which remain exposed.
For markets, the broader takeaway is that Gulf financial strength has held. A fuller examination of the region’s performance under fire appears in the November issue of Global Finance Magazine, and related coverage is available at https://gfmag.com/capital-raising-corporate-finance/gulf-states-prove-resilient-in-iran-conflict/. The combination of high prices, diversified revenue, alternative export infrastructure, and sovereign wealth buffers has so far kept the GCC’s comparative advantage intact. Even so, individual states with weaker fiscal positions, like Bahrain, show how quickly that cushion can erode, and whether the stronger sovereigns can sustain it through any further escalation remains the open question for investors.
Q&A
How did the US-Iran conflict affect Gulf oil export routes?
Hostilities effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to normal commercial shipping, and Houthi attacks near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait added pressure. Saudi Arabia moved crude through its East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu after a September drone attack shutdown, and the UAE relied on its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline to the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz entirely. Shipping was also redirected toward African ports, including those in South Africa.
What happened to Gulf foreign exchange reserves during the conflict?
Saudi Arabia's reserves rose to 1.82 trillion Saudi riyals ($485.3 billion) in August from 1.78 trillion riyals ($474.6 billion) in January, and the UAE's reserves stayed relatively stable at 931.4 billion dirhams ($253.6 billion) at the end of the second quarter. Bahrain was the exception, with reserves falling to $3.9 billion in June from $7.1 billion in February.
Why did oil revenue hold up despite lower export volumes?
Crude prices rose from an average of $66 per barrel in January to over $100 in September, so higher prices compensated for the decline in export volumes. Continued exports, albeit at lower volumes, kept revenue flowing, and booming non-oil sector earnings added a second income stream as the GCC states diversify their economies.
What is the main risk highlighted for investors?
The divergence between strong sovereigns and weaker ones like Bahrain, where high government debt servicing and a widening budget deficit eroded reserves, shows how quickly the cushion can erode without fiscal discipline. Whether the stronger sovereigns can sustain their buffers through any further escalation remains the open question for investors.