Bahrain's 1.6 million residents feel war at their doorstep

For the roughly 1.6 million people who call Bahrain home, the war that widened in February has not been an abstraction. It has arrived at their shores in the form of missile and drone strikes that hit an oil refinery, an aluminum smelter and a desalination plant, the kind of facilities on which daily life and livelihoods depend. By August, the US Congressional Research Service ranked the kingdom as the fourth-most-targeted country by Iran. That is a striking burden for the smallest state in the Gulf Cooperation Council, one that sits barely 200 km from Iranian territory.

Yet Bahrain’s experience is not only a story of exposure. It is also one of resilience and of choice. Rather than pulling back from the partnerships that have made the country a strategic hub, Manama has deepened its security integration with key allies. The decision reflects a simple principle: when national security rests on collective arrangements, sustaining those arrangements matters as much as defending territory itself.

The scale of what Bahrain has absorbed is considerable. Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which houses US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet, suffered serious damage, with preliminary repair estimates reaching at least $400 million. For a small population living so close to a regional adversary, the costs of alignment are unusually visible. The kingdom’s limited strategic depth means that hosting critical allied infrastructure carries risks its people cannot escape.

That vulnerability, however, is precisely what gives the country its value to collective defense. US naval activity has been based in Bahrain since 1948, and the kingdom became a major non-NATO Ally in 2002. Today it hosts the Fifth Fleet, NAVCENT and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, a 47-nation maritime partnership. The UK maintains its largest external naval base there. Bahrain has participated in NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative since 2005 and was the first Gulf state to publicly announce its participation in the US-led International Maritime Security Construct in 2019. These arrangements provide the physical and institutional foundations through which partners coordinate operations, sustain deployments and protect vital shipping routes. When infrastructure supporting multiple allies is damaged, the consequences extend far beyond the host country, forcing forces to reorganize logistics and find alternative facilities across thousands of miles. The vulnerability of a small state, in other words, becomes a collective operational problem.

Bahrain’s response since early 2026 has reinforced this logic. On March 5, as Iranian strikes continued, Bahrain, the US and the UK convened extraordinary consultations under the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement. By late September, the kingdom had become the first Gulf partner publicly identified as joining CENTCOM’s Task Force Falcon Strike, a multinational, multidomain initiative built around one-way attack drones and unmanned systems operating in the air, on the surface and underwater. Heightened exposure has encouraged deeper integration rather than strategic retrenchment.

That commitment is backed by investment. US foreign military sales notifications for Bahrain in 2026 included $1.62 billion in Patriot missiles, $253 million in precision-guided munitions, $445 million for F-16 sustainment and $950 million for AH-1Z attack helicopters. Broader economic ties reinforce the relationship. During Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa’s visit to Washington in July 2025, Bahraini and American companies announced about $17 billion in agreements spanning aviation, technology, industry and investment.

Bahrain’s role predates the current conflict. When Houthi attacks threatened Red Sea shipping in late 2023, it was the only Arab state publicly named among the initial participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian, and its subsequent support for US-UK strikes against Houthi military targets carried political risks. In December 2025, Bahrain and CENTCOM opened a bilateral Combined Command Post for air defense at Ras Al-Bar Camp, giving partners a dedicated structure for joint planning and operations. For a smaller state, hosting such a facility is a force multiplier: its contribution lies not only in aircraft, ships or personnel but in enabling partners to plan and respond together.

Meanwhile, the same logic shapes Bahrain’s ties with its Gulf neighbors. Manama has described Saudi security as integral to its own, supported Riyadh’s right to defend itself against renewed Houthi threats, and publicly stood with Saudi Arabia and Qatar after attacks on their tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Its diplomatic utility extends further, from joining the Abraham Accords in 2020 to facilitating contacts between Sudan’s warring parties in January 2024.

For the GCC, the lesson is that collective defense must connect the different strengths of its members. Saudi Arabia and the UAE bring substantial military and economic resources, while smaller neighbors provide strategically located facilities, specialized capabilities and essential links. NATO should draw the same conclusion, since access to ports and airfields, hosted command facilities and the ability to sustain operations under attack all shape an alliance’s effectiveness. Bahrain’s experience shows that a smaller state can be both a front-line target and an indispensable partner, and the real task ahead is ensuring an attack on one does not undermine the security of all.

Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council.