Regional Powers Reshape Middle East Through Quiet Deals and Military Moves

Three years of war since Gaza, and six months of open U.S.-Iran conflict, have redrawn the map of the Middle East. Not through formal treaties or public declarations, but through bilateral deals, joint military actions, and quiet realignments that are reshaping how ordinary people across the region live, move, and survive.

The fracture has produced three competing power centers, each anchored by a different state: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. For the families caught between them, the consequences are immediate and concrete.

Nowhere is that clearer than in Yemen. Ansar Allah, the Houthi movement backed by Tehran, has targeted commercial shipping in the Red Sea in response to the Gaza conflict, once again threatening passage through the Suez Canal. Iran simultaneously maintains leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. The disruption to trade routes is not abstract. It shapes what goods reach ports, what prices families pay, and what livelihoods survive.

Marc Saxer, a geopolitical analyst with Germany’s Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, told Newsweek that even if the U.S. and Israel achieve their immediate objectives, “the United States will emerge looking less reliable and predictable, and less capable of protecting its allies or keeping vital sea lanes open.” Saxer described interlocking conflicts accelerating the breakdown of regional order, with Israel and Iran competing for hegemony while a coalition of middle powers centered on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt seeks to balance against both.

The Axis of Resistance, the most established of these groupings, has roots stretching back to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Lebanese Hezbollah, built with Iranian backing during Israel’s 1980s invasion, was the first to intervene against Israel after Hamas’s October 2023 attack. The group has since suffered severe casualties, including the death of longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in Israeli strikes. Iraqi Shiite militias that coalesced after the 2003 U.S. invasion, among them Kataib Hezbollah, the Nujaba Movement, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, later organized under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq banner to strike U.S. and Israeli targets.

Tehran-based analyst Amir Hossein Vazirian told Newsweek that “the Axis of Resistance is not gone. They exist, and in the near future, they hold some military capability, but they will probably convert to a security and political network rather than just a military network.”

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia anchors what analysts call the “Sunni Diamond,” a coalition that also includes Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Kingdom’s influence draws on its role as host to Islam’s holiest sites and on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 modernization program. The conflict has pushed Riyadh to deepen ties with Pakistan, with which it signed a defense pact last September, and to convert its rivalry with Turkey into something closer to strategic partnership. Pakistan and Qatar have proven central to U.S.-Iran mediation efforts, while Oman leads direct Strait of Hormuz negotiations with Tehran.

These nations have largely maintained positive relations with Washington. Yet the ongoing conflict has raised hard questions about the credibility of U.S. security commitments, questions that ripple through the calculations of governments and the anxieties of citizens across the region.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s position carries particular weight. Ankara’s role in expediting Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in Syria, supporting Libya’s internationally recognized government, and aiding Azerbaijan’s dismantling of the Armenia-backed Artsakh separatist state demonstrates Turkey’s capacity to deliver military outcomes. Erdogan’s standing with the Trump administration adds another layer of complexity.

Former Saudi diplomat Saad Abdullah Al Hammad told Newsweek that the conflict’s uncertainty “creates a relative vacuum in security leadership, potentially driving regional powers toward greater autonomy and an intensified race for indirect influence.” He predicted a shift from “stable deterrence” to “volatile deterrence,” with shadow wars of limited strikes, cyber operations, and proxy conflicts becoming more likely than all-out war. For communities already living through years of instability, that distinction offers cold comfort.

A third grouping, sometimes called the “Hexagon” alliance, centers on Israel and includes the United Arab Emirates, which broke Arab consensus by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel under the 2020 Abraham Accords. Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco followed. The UAE has deepened Israeli partnerships despite public criticism of operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Israel has also cultivated ties with India through the I2U2 mechanism alongside the U.S. and UAE, and partnered with Greece and Cyprus to counter Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The feud between Netanyahu and Erdogan has sharpened, with some Israeli officials arguing that Ankara and a “Sunni axis” pose a greater threat than Tehran. Yoel Guazansky, senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, told Newsweek that the war has created a “zero-sum game” where Israel’s partnerships with the UAE and others become increasingly valuable.

Andreas Krieg, senior lecturer at King’s College London’s School of Security Studies, characterized the emerging environment as “a highly competitive multipolar system in which states hedge, cooperate tactically and compete simultaneously.” Iran, Israel, and the UAE have each built regional networks involving militias, political movements, commercial ties, intelligence relationships, and local armed partners. None of these networks can conquer territory or win conventional wars. But they can obstruct rivals, impose costs, and shape local politics, often at the expense of the people living inside them.

Iran’s acting Defense Minister recently proposed that the Islamic Republic join Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others in a larger Muslim alliance. Krieg told Newsweek that “the proposal matters even if it fails,” because it reflects Tehran’s assessment that the postwar environment offers an opportunity to move from informal influence to formal status. “If the Islamic Republic survives the war, regional governments will have to recalibrate,” Krieg said. “A return to a containment-only strategy will not work.”

What that recalibration looks like for the families, workers, and communities caught between these competing blocs remains the open question the region has yet to answer.