Three people, including a child, were hurt by falling shrapnel in Qatar on Sunday when an Iranian missile was intercepted overhead. That single detail captures what this conflict means for the people living beneath it.
Over the past week, air defence systems activated across Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan as another wave of Iranian attacks swept the region. Iran said it targeted US military positions, claiming strikes on a fuel depot in Jordan, a helicopter maintenance facility in Bahrain, fuel tanks in Kuwait and a Patriot air defence battery. The IRGC also stated it destroyed long-range aerial radar and vessel detection systems in Oman, though those claims remain unverified. The attacks followed renewed US strikes on Iran’s southern coast, including hits on Qeshm Island and around the port cities of Bandar Abbas, Sirik and Jask.
Iran has consistently claimed to target only US military positions. Yet its missiles and drones are entering Gulf airspace, striking sovereign territory and wounding civilians through interceptions or direct hits. The gap between stated intent and lived reality is widening.
This latest exchange comes less than a month after Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding intended to halt a war that began on February 28, after Israel and the US launched strikes on Iran. Both sides have since accused the other of violating the agreement. The renewed escalation centres partly on the Strait of Hormuz, where the memorandum states Iran has control over international maritime traffic. Iranian forces attacked commercial vessels off Oman; the US said it hit Iranian military positions involved in threats to shipping there. Iran responded by firing missiles and drones at bases across the Gulf where US forces are deployed.
The bind facing Gulf populations is stark. An estimated 50,000 US soldiers are stationed across the region at military facilities in at least 19 locations spanning Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. That presence makes those countries targets. It also, repeatedly, stops incoming weapons before they reach cities.
Simon Mabon, a professor of international relations at Lancaster University, put it plainly: “The Gulf states are in a bind because they’re being targeted due to their relationships with the US, but their relations with the US and the presence of those bases have also meant that many of the attacks have largely been thwarted or their consequences diminished.”
Over decades, Gulf countries have built layered air defence networks combining US, European and, in some cases, Russian, Chinese and Israeli systems. Saudi Arabia operates the region’s largest network, anchored by Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems and Patriot PAC-3 batteries. The UAE runs THAAD and Patriot systems alongside Israel’s Barak platform. Qatar has invested in Patriot batteries and the Norwegian-US-made NASAMS III system. Kuwait fields Patriot PAC-3 batteries for long-range defence alongside Italian Aspide launchers and various short-range missile systems. Bahrain recently acquired the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement system. Oman, with fewer advanced long- and medium-range systems than its neighbours, operates NASAMS, French Mistral missiles and Russian Strela-2 portable systems backed by anti-aircraft gun platforms.
These networks have demonstrated real capability. No air defence system, however, is impenetrable.
Bader Mousa Al-Saif, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme and a professor at Kuwait University, described the Gulf’s security relationship with the US as enabling “an exemplary defensive posture”. Gulf countries, he said, had recorded “some of the highest interception rates seen in recent months”, reflecting both continued investment in US security ties and broader efforts to diversify defence partnerships. In June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council reaffirmed their shared commitment to regional security at a ministerial meeting.
The cost equation, though, is grinding. Iran has invested heavily in comparatively cheap, domestically produced Shahed drones designed to threaten infrastructure without depending on large, fixed radar installations. Many Iranian drones cost approximately $30,000 each to produce. Advanced interceptor missiles cost millions. A sustained campaign could force Gulf countries and the US to burn through costly, finite stockpiles against far cheaper incoming weapons.
“The biggest challenge is capacity, and that’s becoming an increasing concern, particularly the continued use of very expensive interceptor missiles against relatively cheap drones,” Mabon said.
Iran does not need to overwhelm every layer of Gulf air defences. It can impose costs simply by keeping those systems on constant alert, depleting interceptor stocks and stretching personnel and logistics. The contest is becoming one of endurance as much as military technology.
Al-Saif suggested this advantage may prove temporary as the defence industry adapts. “We’re already seeing the defence industry respond by producing lower-cost interceptors. Over time, that will change the economics of missile defence and better match the asymmetric threats Gulf countries face, particularly from Iran,” he said. He characterised the current confrontation as a “no war, no peace” scenario, with both Iran and the US engaging in calibrated escalation rather than seeking decisive military victory.
Meanwhile, the crisis is accelerating cooperation among Gulf states, including sharing of radar data, tracking missiles and aircraft across borders, coordinating warning systems and developing more integrated air defences. Gulf states are also pursuing defence partnerships with Ukraine, South Korea and several European countries to strengthen domestic manufacturing and reduce dependence on a single supplier. Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence pact with Pakistan in September. The UAE and Bahrain have deepened security ties with Israel.
Geography, however, does not move. Analysts noted that Gulf states recognise a functioning political relationship with Iran is necessary given its proximity. The UAE restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022. Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise ties in 2023 under a deal brokered by China. Iranian attacks have tested that logic without fully breaking it.
The economic stakes are immediate for ordinary people across the region. The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are particularly exposed to disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, as most or all of their export ports lie within it. Restrictions on shipping there threaten the oil and gas revenues those states depend on. The Gulf’s economic model rests on stability: the movement of trade, capital, tourists and migrant workers across a region marketed as safe and open for business. Mabon noted that “the conflict has dramatically affected all of these areas.”
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said confidence in diplomacy to end the crisis remains low, but no nation in the region “can afford another long war”. Depleted global oil inventories add pressure: “All inventories have not been able to be replenished” during the ceasefire, Parsi said. “We are at a much lower level globally.”
Qatar and Oman, despite being attacked in recent days, have continued playing central roles in diplomatic efforts between Iran and the US. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has warned that renewed strikes undermine mediation, but it has not walked away from those efforts. Whether that diplomatic thread holds, or snaps under the weight of the next exchange, is the question that will shape daily life across the Gulf in the weeks ahead.