Ahmed Alkhuzaie, a Bahraini analyst and managing partner at the Washington-based Khuzaie Associates LLC, delivered a blunt assessment to The Jerusalem Post on Monday: Gulf governments are running out of patience, and limited military strikes against Iran have become a realistic possibility.
Speaking from a region where Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continues launching attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, targeting what Tehran claims are US military facilities and assets in those countries, Alkhuzaie laid out the calculus facing Gulf decision-makers. While these governments have not historically favored direct offensive operations, he said, “the possibility of limited strikes, heightened maritime patrols, or covert actions cannot be ruled out if provocations continue.”
Iran’s campaign has accelerated dramatically since the collapse of its Memorandum of Understanding with Washington. These fresh assaults come as Tehran’s broader strategy to dominate the Strait of Hormuz has largely unraveled. Its attempts to control shipping through the Omani route, and diplomatic overtures promising favorable treatment to compliant states, have both failed to gain traction.
Facing this impasse, Gulf nations must navigate a narrow path. They need to respond in ways that demonstrate resolve without triggering uncontrolled escalation. “The strategic imperative for these states is to balance deterrence with stability, ensuring that Iran understands the costs of continued aggression,” Alkhuzaie said. Any coordinated response would likely flow through the Peninsula Shield Force, the joint military command of the Gulf Cooperation Council, representing both the shared military resources and political unity among member states.
The Peninsula Shield Force has evolved substantially over time. It now encompasses ground forces, air capabilities, and naval assets specifically designed to address regional threats, meaning Gulf states can mobilize a coordinated response rather than acting independently. Beyond the formal structure, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates command leading military capabilities. Kuwait, traditionally cautious in its foreign policy approach, nevertheless maintains a capable defensive force.
The broader security architecture extends further still. US military presence across the region strengthens the overall defensive position. Oman’s geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz adds strategic value, while Bahrain’s role hosting the US Fifth Fleet provides critical maritime security support. Taken together, these assets form what Alkhuzaie described as a “layered security network” that transcends pure military power. The region’s collective geography, commanding chokepoints, coastlines, and airspace, adds strategic weight to any potential response, and even smaller states amplify their influence through collective action within the GCC framework.
By contrast, a sharply different view came from Mojtaba Dehghani, an Iranian analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, who told The Jerusalem Post that Gulf states likely possess greater tolerance for Iranian attacks than their public statements suggest. Their primary concern, he argued, is not national pride but rather “preserving stability, investment confidence and the image that the Persian Gulf is still relatively insulated from a wider war.”
Dehghani predicted that direct military action by Gulf states remains unlikely in the near term. Instead, he foresees an “indirect and layered response” involving deeper coordination with the US, expanded air defense integration, intelligence sharing, and enhanced maritime security. Gulf states would probably continue channeling diplomatic pressure through Oman and Qatar while avoiding the appearance of leading a war against Iran. The threshold for direct action would need to be substantially higher: large-scale casualties on Gulf soil, major strikes on Saudi or Emirati energy infrastructure, a prolonged Hormuz closure, or clear evidence that US deterrence has failed entirely.
“Until then, I would expect them to let Washington carry most of the visible military burden while they strengthen their own defenses,” Dehghani said, noting that Gulf tolerance is shrinking but remains sufficient to avoid immediate escalation. The dilemma is acute: these states require protection from Iran, yet the more visibly they align with a harder US-Israel security posture, the more exposed they become to Iranian retaliation.
Recent events have sharpened the tension. Yemen’s defense ministry acknowledged that its forces targeted a runway at Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing, though initial reports incorrectly attributed the strike to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia itself has not been among Iran’s recent targets, though it suffered civilian losses in previous Iranian aerial assaults. The question of whether striking Iranian proxies could provide sufficient response without full escalation remains open.
Alkhuzaie suggested Gulf states were “heading that way,” and pointed to the toll already absorbed by regional economies. “Our economies suffered enough,” he said. “We can’t keep getting hit forever.” Whether that breaking point arrives before or after a significant escalation is the question now hanging over the Gulf. More information on the broader regional context is available at https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-902368.