Kuwaiti and Bahraini officials were still assessing damage from Iranian strikes when Gulf leaders began asking a question that could define the region’s next decade: can they negotiate their own security terms with Iran before Washington and Tehran settle the larger deal themselves?
The window is narrow. On June 14, the United States and Iran reached a framework agreement to halt the war that began in late February. Three days later, President Donald Trump signed a one-page memorandum of understanding at the Palace of Versailles. The agreement extends a ceasefire for 60 days, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts dueling naval blockades, and halts military operations across the region, including in Lebanon. Both sides committed to negotiate harder questions during the window that follows: Iran’s nuclear program, its uranium stockpile, and sanctions relief. The United States and Gulf Cooperation Council states agreed that once a final deal is reached, they would finance at least 300 billion dollars for Iran’s reconstruction, gradually lift nuclear-related and unilateral sanctions, and issue immediate waivers for Iranian oil and petrochemical exports. A binding United Nations Security Council resolution would ratify the final agreement.
Yet limited Iranian attacks against Gulf states have continued. That reality has shifted the central question from whether a deal is achievable to whether the Gulf Cooperation Council can secure one that protects its territory, infrastructure, and economic ambitions before the 60-day clock runs out.
Saudi Arabia is best positioned to lead. The kingdom has direct experience negotiating with Iran and maintains active communication channels with Tehran’s leadership. Riyadh has demonstrated considerable restraint despite previous Iranian attacks on Saudi infrastructure, avoiding overt retaliation or militaristic rhetoric. That restraint positions the kingdom well to lead a Gulf-wide negotiation on a non-aggression pact while bringing in other stakeholders, including China, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Reports suggest Saudi Arabia has already begun consulting Gulf partners and European actors to pursue this direction.
A non-aggression pact would likely be modeled on the Helsinki Agreement, which laid the foundation for Cold War détente between the Soviet Union and Western countries in 1975. The Gulf version would be a limited, security-focused agreement confined to the Gulf and adjacent areas. It would establish a baseline for Gulf Cooperation Council-Iran relations through mutual assurances. Gulf states would reaffirm that their territory and airspace will not support offensive operations against Iran, while Tehran would commit not to target Gulf states, their energy and civilian infrastructure, ports, or maritime corridors.
Three critical issues would need to be addressed. Territorial restraint would prohibit physical, cyber, or proxy attacks against either side’s territory and critical infrastructure. Maritime restraint would ban harassment, seizure, mining, or attacks on shipping through Gulf-administered waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. A dedicated deconfliction and de-escalation channel, supported by regional mediators such as Oman and Qatar and expandable to other signatories, would address potential violations before they escalate.
Digital infrastructure represents a likely gray area. Tehran argues that Gulf-based data centers support U.S. military targeting and surveillance operations against Iran. For Gulf Cooperation Council states, artificial intelligence infrastructure is a cornerstone of their economic transformation strategies and a major red line.
The agreement would not require political reconciliation or strategic trust as a precondition. Instead, it would establish a narrow framework for near-term mutual restraint while leaving the region’s deeper security disputes unresolved. Iran would continue its rivalry with the United States and Israel, while Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council would retain their security partnerships with Washington. Issues such as U.S. military basing, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s support for proxy groups, and Iranian missile and drone capabilities would still require negotiation through this or parallel platforms.
By contrast, the benefits for Saudi Arabia are concrete. A non-aggression pact would allow Riyadh to reassert leadership within the Gulf Cooperation Council by freezing the kinetic dimension of the conflict and creating space for renewed Saudi-United Arab Emirates cooperation. That cooperation has frayed. The United Arab Emirates-Saudi schism risks undermining the coordination a non-aggression pact would require, and Israel has sought to exploit that insecurity by positioning itself as a key security partner to Abu Dhabi, widening the gap between the Gulf’s two largest economies. Yet both capitals still share an interest in preventing the Gulf from being viewed as a permanent conflict zone. Sustained instability would undermine investor confidence and raise the cost of every major transformation project in the region.
A non-aggression pact could also shift the Saudi-Iran rivalry from military confrontation back to geoeconomic competition. Saudi Arabia will not compete with Iran in open combat, as potential losses would jeopardize Vision 2030 and the broader diversification agenda that underpins regime legitimacy. A return to peacetime competition would allow Riyadh to compete with Tehran through economic and diplomatic statecraft, particularly if U.S. and United Nations sanctions continue to constrain Iran’s economy.
Several barriers could prevent success. Israel’s leadership could disrupt any Gulf-Iran de-escalation track. Netanyahu’s government has continued to treat perpetual war with Iran as politically useful, despite recent polling suggesting military action has not delivered the political dividends the coalition expected ahead of the October 2026 Israeli elections. Trump reinforced this dynamic by linking a U.S.-brokered ceasefire with Iran to Gulf normalization with Israel, telling Arab leaders that he expected them to normalize relations in exchange for a ceasefire deal. Normalization remains a non-starter for Saudi Arabia and other non-signatory Gulf states of the Abraham Accords, which continue to condition normalization on an irreversible path to Palestinian statehood. If Israel retains the ability to restart strikes at will, any Gulf-Iran understanding would remain fragile.
Iran could also undermine a non-aggression pact through selective escalation. Tehran may read Gulf restraint as evidence that its threat posture is working and sustain selective strikes to preserve that leverage. Any agreement would therefore require a clear, agreed-upon response to possible Iranian violations.
The remaining question is whether Riyadh and Abu Dhabi can convert their shared support for de-escalation into a common negotiating position before the 60-day window closes. Without a coordinated Gulf Cooperation Council approach, Iran and Israel could exploit Gulf divisions, leaving the bloc unable to function as a coherent diplomatic entity.
A Gulf Cooperation Council-Iran non-aggression pact will not end the broader war. It might, however, take the Gulf states out of it. If the Gulf waits for Washington and Tehran to settle the larger questions before defining its own terms, it will inherit whatever bargain they strike, and lose the chance to shape one that protects Gulf interests.