Iran's State Apparatus Recasts UAE as Hostile Operator

Iran’s diplomatic and media machinery swung into full operation against the United Arab Emirates in late September 2026, coordinating statements, editorials, and official interviews across the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy apparatus within days. The campaign now treats Abu Dhabi less as a cautious neighbor and more as an operational extension of Iran’s principal adversaries, a shift with practical consequences for how the Emirates should prepare for future conflict.

The machinery first mobilized on September 25, 2026, after Emirati official Reem Ibrahim al Hashimi renewed her government’s claims to three Persian Gulf islands under Iranian control. Iran’s Assistant Foreign Minister Kazem Gharib-Abadi responded within the state’s established position, declaring that the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands and Abu Musa are “an inseparable part of Iran’s realm” and advising the Emiratis to “show commitment to neighborly goodwill and accept the region’s historical and legal realities.”

Three days later, the tempo increased. On September 28, 2026, Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed confirmed that, at his invitation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had traveled to Abu Dhabi. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal statement warning that “all countries of the region should be careful about the consequences of such trips that threaten the collective peace and security of the region.”

Behind the official statements sits a broader media infrastructure. Nour News, an outlet close to the Supreme National Security Council, published multiple editorials against the Emirates. One cited Israel’s deployment of the Iron Dome to the Emirates as evidence that “Abu Dhabi today is not merely Iran’s southern neighbor; it is a country that, at the most sensitive juncture, has escalated its cooperation with Iran’s principal adversary to a overt and operational level.” The same essay described the Emirates as a military dimension of “the enemy,” which has “frankly talked about political change in Iran.” Other outlets went further, calling the United Arab Emirates a “legitimate target.” A second essay branded the Emirates “hypocritical” for speaking of regional stability while hosting Netanyahu, concluding, “If Abu Dhabi truly wants stability, the path will … lead to a change in behavior, acceptance of the region’s new realities, and participation in local security mechanisms,” meaning a regional order that excludes America and Israel.

The claims about the islands themselves operate on a longer timeline. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi seized the islands in 1971 as the British withdrew, and the issue cuts across Iran’s political spectrum. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son, has reiterated Iranian sovereignty over the islands while criticizing the regime for risking their loss through weakness. Even the regime opposition does not accept Emirati claims. The government, for its part, has used the issue to defend Iranian nationalism and legitimize itself, a tactic with diminishing returns before the recent war but one that gained a new lifeline from the regime’s success during the conflict.

Meanwhile, technical and academic voices were brought into the effort. On October 3, 2026, the Islamic Republic News Agency published an interview with Hadi Borhani, a University of Tehran professor, who called the United Arab Emirates “Israel’s gate into the Arab and Islamic world” and argued that “collaborating with Israel will make the Emirates more vulnerable during a possible crisis.” He contrasted Abu Dhabi with Amman, Cairo, and Riyadh, which have been more critical of Jerusalem in recent years despite formal relations in two of those capitals.

Reformist journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi, who spent years in prison after the 2009 Green Movement, joined in, warning of “the Netanyahu gang’s secret and conspiratorial plots against Iran” while suggesting a softer diplomatic tone, domestic unity, and statecraft as the working response. Former foreign minister Ali-Akbar Velayati, a longtime adviser to Ali Khamenei and, in theory, Mojtaba Khamenei as well, linked the two controversies directly: “A country, whose political age does not reach half a century, claims the islands which in previous centuries’ documents and maps are recorded as Iran’s from the United Nations tribune.” Further context and analysis of this campaign appears at https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/iran-sees-united-arab-emirates-as-an-enemy-alongside-the-united-states-and-israel.

The pattern across these statements is consistent. In Tehran’s view, American and Israeli presence in the region is destabilizing, while Iranian foreign policy is the natural reaction to imperial and colonial projects. The practical outcome is a relationship approaching a point of no return, deteriorating beyond even the period when Iran launched rocket and drone attacks during the war. Where Tehran once handled Abu Dhabi and Dubai cautiously because of significant Iranian investment in both cities, current statements suggest ideological hostility will now override pragmatism, and Abu Dhabi should expect greater attacks in future conflicts as Iran treats the Emirates more like Israel and less like other Arab states.